Re-measuring left-right: a better model for extracting left-right political party policy preference scores by Bakker, Ryan
  
 
 
 
Re-Measuring Left-Right:  A Better Model for Extracting 
Left-Right Political Party Policy Preference Scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ryan Bakker 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of 
Philosophy in the Department of Political Science. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2007   
 
 
       
 
        Approved By: 
 
        Gary Marks 
 
        Liesbet Hooghe 
 
        Marco Steenbergen 
 
        Jim Stimson 
 
        Jefferson Gill 
 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ryan Bakker: Re-Measuring Left-Right:  A Better Model for Extracting 
Left-Right Political Party Policy Preference Scores. 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
 
  
 
 The left-right dimension of political party competition is one of the most 
fundamental concepts used in political science.  Several measures of this concept are 
available for use by scholars in the field.  In this dissertation, I examine the strengths 
and weaknesses of two of the most prominently used sources of these placements:  
party manifestos and expert survey data.  I then develop a more sophisticated 
technique for extracting such a dimension from these data and demonstrate its 
superior reliability and validity. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 One of the most fundamental concepts used in the study of political parties is 
the left-right dimension of party competition. This dimension is, “vital is evaluating 
hypotheses on structures of democratic competition and conflict, on the interplay 
between electorates and political parties, or on how public policy is shaped by 
political parties with different agendas” (Marks 2006). The left-right dimension gives 
us the ability to compare parties within a common space and across time (see 
Duverger 1951, Downs 1957, Converse 1964, Dahl 1966, Satori 1976, Rabinowitz 
and MacDonald 1989, Van der Eijk 1999 to name a few) and has been referred to as 
the “core currency of political exchange in Western Democracies “ (MacDonald et at  
2005). Given the centrality of this concept to such a vast array of empirical analyses, 
it is necessary to develop a valid and reliable measure of the left-right positions of 
political parties.  
  The use of the terms left and right to describe political affiliation dates back to 
Revolutionary France. Feuillant, a monarchist and a reactionary, sat on the far right of 
the Legislative Assembly of 1791, while the radical Mantagnard positioned himself to 
the far left of the chamber in order to distance himself from Feuillant (Blattbert 2001). 
The concept of left-right politics originally was used to distinguish attitudes toward 
the ancient regime and only later came to be associated with economic issues such  
as redistribution of wealth and the equality versus liberty debate, for example.  
 As is often the case in the social sciences, there is no direct measure of this 
dimension. Unfortunately, we cannot simply count off the number of steps between 
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Feuillant and Montagnard in the Legislative Assembly and observe this dimension 
directly. We must, instead, develop a measurement technique that allows us to place 
political parties on an abstract dimension which we call left-right. To do this, we 
estimate the distance between parties by evaluating observable imperfect measures 
that, combined, compose the concept of interest. This process introduces a degree of  
uncertainty that is often ignored by researchers. That is, it is commonplace for 
researchers to estimate a latent dimension and then treat this estimate as observed 
data.  
  Hubert Blalock once wrote that “…the most serious and important problems 
that require our immediate and concerted attention are those of conceptualization and 
measurement, which have too long been neglected” (1979). Although some recent 
advances in methodological sophistication, such as item response theory, have helped 
in this regard, our attempts to measure abstract concepts are often based on subjective 
assessments based on the perceptions of scholars or survey respondents, for example. 
This process introduces two issues that must be addressed when measuring  
abstract concepts.   
  First, we must decide which assessments of which indicators should be used. 
That is, we are forced to choose, often arbitrarily, which observable indicators, and 
how many of them, are necessary to construct a valid measure of the abstract concept 
of interest. Second, we must decide upon the proper aggregation or data reduction 
technique. These techniques vary in complexity and appropriateness—from simple 
linear additive scales to more complicated data reduction methods (see Trier and 
Jackman 2003 and Bollen and Paxton for a detailed discussion). Added to these issues 
is the fact that most researchers employing such techniques ignore the problem of 
measurement error that is inherent in these processes. Given that the latent dimension 
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we extract form the data is an estimate, regardless of the technique used to extract it, 
we should report the uncertainty involved in this estimation process.  
  The following series of articles addresses the measurement of left-right policy 
preferences for political parties in Western Europe keeping in mind the issues 
described above. In order to develop a more reliable and valid measure of left-right, I 
argue that we should combine the available sources of information rather than rely on 
any single instrument. This should allow us to build off the strengths while 
minimizing the weaknesses of the different measures of left-right that are currently 
available.  
  Before combining sources, however, we must identify the available sources of 
left-right placement and the relationships between them. The first article in this 
dissertation examines the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data. These data are 
particularly desirable in that they provide estimates of policy preferences from the end 
of World War II to the present for OECD countries. No other source spans such a 
long time frame nor contains such a large number of cases, which is why the CMP  
data are the most widely used source of left-right placements. This is also why the 
measurement techniques used to create scales from CMP data deserve such close 
scrutiny and attention.  
 This article outlines some of the major problems with the treatment of CMP 
data in their present form. Most of these issues are methodological rather than 
substantive, but substantive criticisms of the CMP scale are certainly possible. These 
data suffer from problematic coding decisions, large amounts of missingness, and 
untenable assumptions regarding the creation of a summated rating scale. In this 
article I identify these problems and demonstrate their effects in terms of 
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comparability of left-right scores (or the lack thereof) across time and space and offer 
a simple solution, albeit suboptimal, to ‘cleaning up’ the data.  
  The second article builds of the findings of the first by using the CMP data in 
a more sophisticated manner in order to extract a left-right dimension. In this piece, I 
argue for the use of a Bayesian item response model. I demonstrate that the data 
generation process behind the CMP measure yields the common methods of data 
reduction inappropriate. Most notably, the items used to create the CMP data should 
not be treated as normally distributed. The Bayesian framework grants nearly 
unlimited flexibility in terms of specifying distributional characteristics of the data as  
well as allowing us to incorporate prior information in the model. In this model, the 
left-right placement at a previous time point serves as the prior for the present time 
point, creating a smoother path across time than the original CMP measure. More 
importantly, this addition makes intuitive sense—that is, political parties rarely 
completely reinvent themselves from election to election. 
  Having developed a better model for extracting left-right placement from 
CMP data, the third article explores different techniques for combining these data 
with other sources, most notable of which are surveys of party experts. I begin by 
presenting two structural equation models (SEMs). The results of the first model show 
that the CMP data stand out as the least reliable indicator in the model. One possible 
explanation is that there is a bias toward some parties in these data. In order to 
account for this, the second SEM includes a method factor for the CMP indicators.  
Another possible explanation for the poor fit of the CMP indicators is that the 
common factor model is inappropriate given the structure of the CMP data. I argue, 
then, that a Bayesian model using expert surveys as priors for CMP data yields the 
best results as this measure possesses desirable statistical properties while combining 
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two very different measures of left-right. Finally, I argue that given the design of this 
model the placements are cross-nationally comparable, a characteristic that other 
sources do not possess. 
  The combined result of these three articles will hopefully help not only 
researchers interested in left-right placements of political parties, but anyone 
interested in combining data sources to develop better measures of abstract concepts. 
Although requiring some statistical sophistication, the techniques used in these 
articles vastly improve the quality of measurement. Given this sophistication, 
however, it is likely the case that many substantive scholars would not employ such 
techniques. As my research continues, then, I am working with others to develop 
software routines in R and Stata that will facilitate the use of the methods I suggest. 
Presently, I am working on a project that will allow users to estimate left-right 
placements from CMP data and incorporate these estimates in predictive models, 
while taking account for the uncertainty in the placement. The next step is to 
generalize this routine for use with other data sources. Once completed, I am hopeful  
that the arguments made in this dissertation combined with user-friendly software for 
implementing these arguments, will improve the quality of our measurement and of 
our substantive interpretations of models using estimated variables. 
  
 
 
Chapter 2.  Fickle Parties or Changing Dimensions? 
1.  Introduction 
Since Duverger (1951), scholars of political parties have moved beyond 
simple typologies of parties as socialist or Christian-democratic by analytically 
combining key political issues into a single Left/Right dimension of political conflict. 
The Left/Right dimension constitutes the core aspect of political exchange in Western 
Industrial democracies and allows us to compare party systems, locate political parties 
in a common ideological space or comparatively study the determinants of party 
choice (e. g. Downs, 1957; Dahl, 1966; Blondel, 1968; Satori, 1976; Van der Eijk and 
Niemöller, 1983; Oppenhuis, 1995; Van der Eijk, et al., 1999). Several sources of data 
have been used to order parties along a Left/Right continuum, including surveys of 
country experts or dimensional analysis of mass survey data (Castles and Mair, 1984; 
Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; 
Sani and Satori, 1983). One of the most prominent data sources on left-right 
positioning of political parties is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data 
(Budge, et al., 2001. This data source measures ”[…] the policy preferences publicly 
endorsed by political parties in their election programmes” (Budge and Bara, 2001: 
1). The CMP data are the only source of its kind that maps political party preferences 
consistently across time and space. Hence, the uniqueness of the data source results 
from the fact that it allows researchers to track policy preferences of political parties 
over time and across countries (Budge and Klingemann, 2001).  
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However, despite this abundance of Manifesto data and its repeated use in 
time-series investigations, rigorous analyses of the substantive makeup of the left-
right dimension across time and space are rare. This lack of interest in the cross-
temporal and cross-national dynamics of left/right ideological continuum using CMP 
data is especially worrisome, since questions if the abundance of work on Left/Right 
party positioning thus far is actually comparing like with like. This paper attempts add 
to the literature Left/Right party positioning by examining the prevalent assumption 
that the CMP data can be used as a valid time-series to track dynamics of party 
positioning on the Left/Right dimension. This paper empirically tests two major 
concerns with this assumption. First, that the dimensionality of Left/Right remains 
constant across time and second, that the construction of the Left/Right scale meets 
the standards of statistical reliability assumed by the CMP research group.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we elaborate the specific structure of 
the CMP data and eludicate the theoretical assumptions underlying this data source. 
Second, we present an overview of types of Left/Right scales that have developed on 
the basis of the CMP data. In the third section, we elaborate our own 
operationalization of the Left/Right dimension using CMP data. Fourth, we present 
the main findings of the empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings for the longitudinal use of the CMP data. 
 
2.  Comparative Manifesto Project Data: Structure and Assumptions 
 
This section presents an overview of the specific structure und theoretical 
underpinnings of the CMP data. We first shortly introduce the coding and structure of 
the data. Secondly, elaborate the two major theoretical assumptions underlying the 
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CMP project: Firstly, policy preferences of political parties are best measured using 
manifestos and secondly, that party competition should be understood in terms of 
valence issues and salience. 
 The Manifesto Research Group (MRG) has collected and coded party 
manifestos since 1979. The data comprises of party manifestos from the main political  
parties in 24 OECD countries plus Israel from 1945 to 1998.  Within the CMP 
framework, policy preferences are characterized by the quantitative examination of 
party stances on policy on the basis of the content analysis of election programmes or 
manifestos (Budge, et al., 2001). The election programmes of the respective parties 
are coded on the basis of a so-called ‘quasi-sentence’. “A quasi-sentence is defined as 
an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue.” (Volkens, 
2001b: 34) Hence, one sentence in a manifesto may contain several quasi-sentences. 
In turn, these quasi-sentences are connected to categories in a classification scheme 
by individual coders. Presently, the classification scheme is made up out of 56 
standard categories, measuring parties’ views on a large array of issues ranging from 
market regulation to multiculturalism or European integration. quality control and 
reliability of the CMP expert coders. The quality and reliability of the CMP expert 
coders is monitored since 1989 by intra- and inter-coder reliability tests, which thus 
far demonstrate high levels of correspondence among coders and a low degree of 
variation across coders (see Volkens 2001a, 2001b). 
In eyes of the MRG the study of manifestos yields three major advantages. 
First, the estimation of party preferences regarding policy fields is based on 
authoritative documents issued by the parties or governments themselves. Secondly, 
manifestos are typically prepared prior to every election, which enables the study of 
ideological party positioning across time. Finally, the coding on the basis of common 
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classification scheme allows researchers to track changes in policy positioning within 
and across political parties, as well as across countries and time (Budge, Robertson, 
and Hearl, 1987; Budge and Bara, 2001; Budge and Klingemann, 2001; Volkens, 
2001a, 2001b).  
  The CMP data underlie two main assumptions: First, policy preferences of 
political parties are best measured using manifestos and, secondly, that party 
competition should be understood in terms of valence issues and salience. The coding 
of the party programmes is based on the idea that parties argue with each other “[…] 
by emphasizing different policy priorities rather than directly confronting each other 
on the same issues” (Budge and Bara, 2001: 6-7). This idea is the central theoretical 
assumption underlying the CMP data: valence and salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 
1983; Budge, et al., 2001). Budge and Farlie (1983) argue that party competition 
cannot be characterized as a direct confrontation between parties on the basis of 
opposing views on the same issues (position issues). Rather, parties differ in terms of 
the issues important to them. They focus on a limited number of valence issues and 
ignore the issues important to other parties.  
In this context, the distinction between ‘position’ and ‘valence’ issues is 
relevant (Stokes, 1963: 373). While position issues involve issues that imply different 
options of political action (i.e. opposing or supporting euthanasia or abortion), valence 
issues concern the strength of the link between a party and a certain positively or 
negatively evaluated condition (e.g. the unemployment issue). Thus, the main tenet of 
the salience theory of party competition is that parties compete on the basis of valence 
issues by consciously and strategically highlighting or de- emphasizing selected 
issues. In this view, certain parties come to ‘own’ a particular issue, e.g. welfare for 
social-democratic parties or law and order in the case of conservative parties. Voters 
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will come to associate certain parties with specific issues and, as a result, other parties 
will de-emphasize issues that are connected to rival parties. According to this view, 
confrontational models attempting to explain vote choice and party competition on 
basis direct conflict among parties simply miss the point, as they are based on position 
issues (Rosema, 2004: 37). Or put in the words of Budge (2001: 85): 
 
The picture that emerges [from the saliency perspective] is more subtle and 
differentiated than that provided by a mechanistic counterposing of ‘pro’ and ‘con’ 
positions on each issue. Parties do not square up to each other, landing heavy 
blows on each others’ strong points, like a pair of inexperienced pugilists. Instead 
they duck and weave, avoiding direct hits from their opponents, while seeking an 
opening for their own blow to a weak spot. 
 
It is important to point out that the two main assumptions of CMP data - policy 
preferences of political parties are best measured using manifestos and, secondly, that 
party competition should be understood in terms of valence issues – are contested. 
With regard to the data used to describe party preferences, one could argue that expert 
judgements are more useful than the content analysis of manifesto data, as these 
expert data take into account both the policy pledges made by parties and the extent to 
which they are translated into actual behaviour either in government or in opposition. 
Election programmes are not about actual behaviour. Manifestos present the program 
with which a party intends to distinguish itself from other parties in order to win 
elections and office. Yet, issues may come up during election campaigns or during a 
government period that were hardly dealt with in the manifesto.  
Expert surveys, on the other hand, are based on the judgement of national 
party experts. One can argue that expert judgements combine what parties say and 
what parties do. If an expert is asked about the policy preference of a party on a 
particular issue, she will tap from various sources of information. It is likely that the 
 11 
expert will have a more detailed and accurate knowledge of party programmes than 
the average voter. In addition, the expert will have a good view on the conduct of 
parties. Yet, expert surveys also have clear disadvantages when compared to content 
analysis based coding of political texts. First, they are less valid than text-based 
techniques in terms of tracking party positions across time, as most expert surveys are 
cross-sectional (Mair, 2001).  Second, “[…] a given text can typically be located at a 
precise time point so that a time line of cause and effect can be more confidently 
established” (Laver and Garry, 2000: 622).  On the whole however, the debate with 
regard to the ‘true’ measurement of the ‘factual’ position of a party is endless and 
fruitless, “[…] since the ‘real’ policy position of a political actor is a fundamentally 
elusive, even metaphysical, notion” (Laver and Garry, 2000: 620). 
 The second assumption underlying the CMP data, stating that party 
competition should be understood in terms of salience, is in our view much more 
important and problematic. The saliency theory of party competition is criticized as it 
equates party positions with issue salience (cf. Irwin and Holsteyn, 1989; Rabinowitz 
and McDonald, 1989; Kitschelt, 1994; Laver and Garry, 2000; Laver, 2001a; 
Pellikaan, et al. 2003). Of course, there may well be a sets of issues, such as 
unemployment or environmental protection, in which direction equals salience. In the 
case of unemployment for instance, parties will most likely agree on the ideal 
policies, i.e. less unemployment, but differ in the relative importance given to them. 
Hence, in this case, party positioning may be inferred from the variation in salience 
levels. However, in many other issues areas, such as social redistribution, abortion or 
euthanasia, parties do not share a common understanding of the ideal policy (Laver, 
2001a). When dealing with these kind of issues it is impossible to deduce a party’s 
position from the emphasis attached to these issues in manifestos. Hence, advocates of 
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the confrontational approach argue that contrary to the assumption underlying the 
saliency theory of party competition parties may take opposing stands on the same 
issue. They contend that to understand party competition, we need to distinguish 
between position and emphasis (i.e. salience). The different assumptions about the 
nature of party competition –salience or confrontation – is ultimately an empirical 
question (Gabel and Huber, 2000: 96; Laver and Garry, 2000: 620). 
  
3. Analysing the Left-Right Dimension using Comparative Manifesto 
Project Data: The Story So Far 
 
In this section, we review the five common approaches to calculating party 
Left/Right positions using manifestos data. The first, used by Budge, Robertson, and 
Hearl (1987) in their original analysis of the manifestos data, employs a two-stage 
factor analysis to obtain estimates of party positions on a first factor. This factor then 
becomes the left-right dimension.  Briefly, the first stage in this technique involves 
dividing the fifty-four sentence categories into seven policy domains and extracting 
from each of the seven domains one or two factors.  In the second stage, the two 
leading factors are extracted from the factor-based variables obtained in the first step 
of the procedure.  The first of the second-stage factors supplies the left-right positions. 
 The second approach, employed by Laver and Budge in Party, Policy, and 
Government Coalitions (1992), is a more explicit attempt to estimate left-right 
positions.  Using exploratory principal component analyses, the authors begin by 
collapsing the fifty-four sentence categories into twenty policy dimensions, thirteen of 
which are one category codings from the original data and seven of which are the sum 
of at least two categories.  They then utilize these twenty policy dimensions to run 
additional country specific factor analyses.  Based on the results of their country 
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specific examination, the authors divide the twenty variables into three groups:  
variables that load consistently at one end of the scale, variables that consistently load 
on the other end of the scale, and variables that fail to load consistently.  Laver and 
Budge discard this final group and calculate the left-right position as the difference 
between the sums of the references of the right cluster the left cluster. 
 Laver and Garry (2000) and Kim and Fording (1998) offer a third approach 
that slightly modifies the technique introduced by Laver and Budge (1992). Rather 
than the subtractive scores employed by Laver and Budge, these authors use ratio 
measures, i.e. they subtract left references from right references and then they divide 
the difference by the total percent of left and right references. Although the 
subtractive method is in line with salience theory, the ratio scoring system presumes 
that Left/Right positions should be understood in respect to how much concern a party 
has for items of the left and right. 
 The fourth approach to calculating left-right position using manifestos data 
was developed by Klingemann (1995). Confining his investigation to domestic policy 
categories, Klingemann makes a substantive assumption concerning which categories 
should and should not be incorporated in a left-right schema.  He then utilizes 
country-specific principal factors analysis to extract the primary underlying 
dimension.  Finally, using the factor loadings of the policy categories, he creates a 
ten-point scale of party factor scores.  This provides his left-right dimension. 
 The final approach is Gabel and Huber’s (2000) so-called “vanilla” method for 
inferring left-right party positions from manifestos data.  As the name implies, this 
technique is entirely inductive, making no assumptions on the substantive policy 
content of the left-right dimension.  According to Gabel and Huber, the left-right 
dimension is defined as “the ‘super issue’ that most constrains parties’ positions 
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across a broad range of policies” (2000: 96).  Their vanilla method seeks to uncover 
this “super issue” and to determine party positions on it.  The technique uses principal 
factor analysis to identify the underlying dimension that best accounts for the 
observed covariation among the fifty-four policy categories.  Based on the results of 
this analysis, the authors position the parties on this dominant dimension using 
regression scoring.  Finally, they place the parties on the left-right dimension using 
the parties’ factor scores after normalizing the scores to an eleven-point scale. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Much recent work regarding the CMP data has focused on cross-validating 
various Left/Right measures with the manifesto-based measures (Laver and Garry 
2000; Gabel and Huber 2000; McDonald and Mendes 2001a, 2001b among others). 
Little to no work, however, has systematically analyzed the reliability of the 
dimensionality of the manifesto Left/Right scales.  Further, no one has yet to compare 
the dimensionality across time and space in order to assess the validity of the 
Left/Right scale over different time periods.  That is, can one validly compare (or 
track) policy preferences over time using these data?  As discussed above, it is a 
highly contentious assertion that the manifesto data accurately predict policy 
preference.  Russel Dalton perhaps says it best: 
 
 One problem is that the Comparative Party Manifestos Project does not 
measure positions along a policy continuum, but simply counts the salience 
given to each policy in the party programme (that is, the percentage of the 
party programme that discusses the issue, regardless of the context of the 
discussion).  In addition, the [CMP] devotes little attention to how separate 
issues are combined to measure the left/right dimension.  The project assumes 
that a constant set of items tap a broad left/right dimension, but factor analyses 
do not yield such a clear empirical structure among these items.  Moreover, a 
single, constant measure does not accommodate the changing meaning of 
left/right over time.  For example, while economic and welfare state issues 
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may have divided political parties in the mid-twentieth century, by the end of 
the century a new set of cultural and quality of life issues had joined the 
political agenda.  In sum, the [CMP] data might not be sufficient to determine 
systematically how party positions have changed over time (Dalton 2004: 
133). 
 
Even if we assume, then, that CMP data can be used to help understand a party’s 
policy preference, it is far from clear that these positions can be validly traced over 
time using the measures developed by the MRG.  One of the most problematic aspects 
of the CMP placement measures is what the MRG group refers to as ‘leapfrogging’.  
This occurs when one party moves to the left or to the right of another party in the 
system.  For example, the British Liberal Party in 1955, according to the CMP 
placement score, is the most ‘right’ party in the system.  In 1966, however, the 
Liberals actually cross-over Labour and are the most ‘left’ party in the system until 
the early 1970s.  This preference volatility is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
Another troubling characteristic of these data is the seemingly absurd placement 
of some parties given an intuitive understanding of European party systems.  For 
example  in 1946 the French Communist party is actually coded as a right-wing party 
and it is not until after the 1956 election that they cross-over to the ‘left’ side of the 
scale and not until 1958 that they ‘leapfrog’ to the left of the Socialists.  Figure 2.2 
shows this movement. 
Such leapfrogging is, unfortunately, the norm in many countries included in the 
CMP data set.  It is unlikely the case that this policy preference volatility represents 
true changes in parties’ placement; rather, problems with both the measurement and 
interpretation of the CMP Left/Right scales are more likely the cause of these 
changes.  
In order to assess the reliability and sources of volatility of the Left/Right 
measures, we systematically un-bundle the scales employed by the MRG group.  That 
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is, we conduct country specific factor analyses for the Left/Right scales in order to see 
which items load consistently across time on the dimension and to get a country 
specific measure of scale reliability.   
As described above, the MRG constructed additive scales of both left and right by 
combining 26 items (13 for the left, 13 for the right) from the original 54 coding 
categories.  Table 2.1 presents an overview of the items used in the construction of 
these scales.No measure of reliability, however, is included in the results presented in 
Budge et al. (2001). Hence, we calculated reliability statistics for the respective items 
used for the construction of the MRG Left/Right scale. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below 
present the Cronbach’s Alpha for left and right items respectively across the EU-15. 
For the left scale, only France surpasses the conventional standard 0.6, while 
only Great Britain, Spain and Sweden meet this level for the right scale.  These results 
seriously question the scalability of these items, particularly when constructing simple 
additive scales. These results are somewhat counter-intuitive, however, in that the 
categories that are combined to create the scales (arguably) should align together 
along one or perhaps two dimensions.  Country specific factor analyses, however, 
confirm that these items do not consistently load together across time and/or space.  
Table 2.4 illustrates how different items load at different levels and in varying 
combinations across countries pooling over all manifestos included in the CMP data 
set. What is most striking about these results is that no single item loads consistently 
across all countries for either the left or the right scales.  
Similar results are obtained when we perform factor analysis controlling for both 
country and time.  For example, if we divide the time period for which the CMP 
collected data in half and perform factor analysis on the items for either the left or the 
right scales, we see that the items that load highly on the first factor change 
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(drastically in some instances) and that different items load on different factors within 
country over time.  The following tables illustrate this effect in the UK for the 13 
items that comprise the Left scale. 
Here we see that not only do the items load in different patterns and levels, but 
that no fewer than 5 components are extracted from the 13 items (principal axis 
factoring using varimax rotation).  The above results are repeated regardless of 
country or length of time period and are indicative of Dalton’s criticism regarding the 
changing meaning of left/right across time. 
 The question still remains, though, as to why these items do not neatly align 
given their substantive similarities and our understanding of what issues comprise a 
Left and a Right issue agenda.  Laver and Garry (2000) suggest that it may be the 
mutually exclusive coding of the MRG that cause some of these issues.  For example, 
some statements should perhaps be coded into two categories, such as Peace and 
Military Negative.  They go on to argue that neutral categories combined with 
balanced items (Pro/Anti issue) would also increase the reliability of these measures.   
 A related issue is the fact that many of the items used to construct these scales 
are primarily filled with zeros.  That is, out of 1,261 cases, over half of the 26 items 
have over 75% zeros as entries in the data set.  These zeros greatly reduce the 
correlations among items and this, in turn, can help to explain the limited reliability of 
the scales.  Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are histograms of two of the items and illustrate the 
‘zero’ problem present in much of these data.  
 One possibility, then, is to eliminate items that are mostly zero in the data set 
and to only use items that load significantly, both substantively and significantly, 
within county.  With these items, then, we can construct country specific Left/Right 
scales that should be more reliable and more stable across time. 
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Following the above procedure, we constructed new Left/Right scores for the 
15 EU countries.  Tables 2.7 and 2.8 list the reliability measures for the new, country 
specific left and right scales using only items that load above 0.3 and for which the 
number of zeros was attempted to be kept to a minimum. 
With few exceptions (notably Finland on the Right), these new scales 
represent drastic improvements over the original ones used by the MRG.  Following 
the same procedure as the MRG and taking the difference of these two scales, we 
constructed a new measure of Left/Right and plotted these across time.  Figures 2.5 
and 2.6 show the change over time of these new scores for the UK and for France. 
Although there is still some volatility and some leapfrogging, both of these are 
less pronounced than with the original measures.  More importantly, the French 
Communist party is coded as left wing and crosses to the left of the Socialists much 
earlier than with the previous MRG measure of Left/Right.  Similar improvements 
occur across all countries and parties using our method of constructing the left and the 
right scales. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Although far from the optimal solution, our method of addressing the lack of 
reliability in the CMP left and right scales demonstrates a serious deficiency with the 
data in their present form.  Even if we assume that issue saliency is equivalent to 
policy preference, our results show that the validity of the dimensionality of the MRG 
Left/Right measure is dubious at best.  This is the case both across time and space and 
brings into question the comparability of these measures and, therefore, the ability to 
accurately trace preference changes over time. 
The ‘too many zeros’ issue does desperately need to be addressed with  
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these data.  Simply discarding items with mostly zeros, however, is certainly not the 
best solution, given the loss of information that occurs.  An alternative method, then, 
would be to condition estimates of the Left/Right dimension of information that we do 
have and to treat the zeros as missing data. Conventional methods of factor analysis, 
however, do not allow for inclusion of such unbalanced items and imputing missing 
data given the preponderance of zeros for many items would be incorrect at best.  
Presently, techniques for addressing this issue are being explored and will be used to 
analyse the dimensionality of these data in the near future. 
 Another possible method for analysing these data would be to allow some 
items to cross load on both the left and the right scales, treating the scales as latent 
variables in a confirmatory factor analysis. In fact, modification indexes show that 
such cross loadings would, in fact, improve the fit of the model in this setting.  
Identification issues, once again stemming from the zeros problem, need to be 
overcome before such alternatives will be feasible, however. 
 We have shown that the scales used to construct the Left/Right measure in the 
CMP data are far from reliable and have attempted to offer an explanation for this 
problem.  We have also demonstrated that the dimensionality of Left/Right changes 
over time and space.  Researchers employing these data should be aware of these 
issues when drawing inferences from this measure.  Future research and technological 
advances will serve to better the use of this data set, which certainly is a rich source of 
data for scholars of party systems in the advanced industrialized world. 
  
Chapter 3:  Take That, You Lousy Dimension 
1. Introduction  
One of the most fundamental concepts used in the study of political parties is the 
leftright dimension of party competition. This dimension is, ”vital in evaluating 
hypotheses on structures of democratic competition and conflict, on the interplay 
between electorates and political parties, or on how public policy is shaped by 
political parties with diﬀerent agendas” (Marks et al. 2006). The left-right dimension 
gives us the ability to compare parties within a common space and across time (See 
Duverger 1951; Downs 1957; Converse 1964; Dahl 1966; Satori 1976; Rabinowitz 
and McDonald 1989; Van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin and Wouter van der Burg 
1999). Given the centrality of this concept to such a vast array of empirical analyses, 
it is necessary to develop a reliable measure of the left-right positions of political 
parties.  
As is often the case in the social sciences, there is no direct measure of this 
dimension. Rather, we estimate the measure by evaluating observable imperfect 
measures that, combined, compose the concept of interest. This process introduces a 
degree of uncertainty that is often ignored by researchers. That is, it is commonplace 
for researchers to estimate a latent dimension and then treat this estimate as observed 
data.  
There are several available measures of parties’ left-right position placements 
which can be grouped into two categories. First are expert surveys, which elicit the 
opinions of party experts as to the position of parties on a variety of diﬀerent issue 
areas. These issue-level placements are then used to construct measures of left-right 
through a variety of methods, ranging from simple additive scales to factor analytic 
techniques (See Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Ray 1999; Benoit and 
Laver 2006).  
The second category of left-right placements are derived from content analyses of 
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parties’ electoral manifestos. The Manifesto Research Group (see Budge et. al) has 
developed the most widely used measure of left-right party placements using this 
technique. They have compiled data for twenty-four OECD countries plus Israel from 
1945-1998. Over one hundred published books and articles have used the MRG data 
in various forms, yet only recently have researchers begun to analyze the reliability 
and validity of these data (See Laver and Garry 2000; Harmel, Janda and Tan 1995; 
Gabel and Huber 2000; Bakker, Edwards and Netjes 2006; Marks et al. 2006).  
The MRG data set is particularly desirable in that it is the only source that includes 
such a large number of countries for such a long period of time. This gives researchers 
the added advantage of being able to track changes in party positions over time, as 
opposed to using expert data which restricts the researcher to a single time point or, at 
best, a small set of time points. Because of this, the MRG data have been widely used 
in comparative party research and are the single most important source of data 
available to this sub-field (see Schofield 1993; Budge, Roberson and Hearl 1987; 
Baron 1991; Laver and Budge 1992; Budge 1994; Adams 1998; Warwick 1994, N.d.).  
Although there exists a reasonably strong correlation between the survey-based 
and the manifesto-based data (Gabel and Huber 2000),neither of these sources 
includes a measure of uncertainty with their estimates of party position. Within the 
manifesto-based research there has been a rich discussion as to how best use the data 
to construct a left-right dimension, but no discussion of assessing the uncertainty 
inherent in the process of estimating party positions. This limits the ability to discern 
whether or not diﬀerent placements are statistically significantly diﬀerent from one 
another. Given the importance of manifesto-based placements this could be an 
extremely important omission. That is, if one could estimate the uncertainty of these 
party placements, the significance of changes within party over time and diﬀerences 
between parties in a party system could be accurately assessed.  
The aim of this article is to improve the use of manifesto-based data in 
constructing a leftright dimension. Ideally, the resulting measure would be based on a 
model appropriate to the data, take account of the dynamic nature of the data, and 
provide a measure of uncertainty in order to make meaningful comparisons across 
time and space. The structure of this article is as follows. First, we will provide a 
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detailed description of the MRG data. Next, we will discuss the diﬀerent techniques 
that have been employed in order to extract a left-right dimension out of these data. 
Then, we will present our model for estimating a left-right measure with the above 
mentioned properties. We will conclude with a discussion of the implications that our 
research has for the use of manifesto-based data and, more generally, for estimating 
latent variables across time.  
2. MRG Data and the Left-Right Dimension  
The MRG began collecting and coding party manifestos in 1979. They identified 
fifty-four policy areas into which each quasi-sentence of a party’s manifesto were 
placed. A quasi-sentence is the ”verbal expression of one political idea or issue” 
(Volkens 2001).That data set contains the percentage of a party’s manifesto that fell 
into each coding category. The resulting left-right scale is constructed by summing 
across certain groups of issues that represent opposing sides of the dimension. The 
diﬀerence of these two sums is then interpreted as the party’s left-right policy 
preference placement.  
There is a considerable degree of dissent regarding the seemingly innocuous 
process described above. Two of the most problematic issues are the manner in which 
the issues that represent left and right are selected and the way in which the left and 
right group scores are combined. The remainder of this section will describe the 
various techniques that have been employed by researchers interested in developing 
reliable measures from the MRG data.  
The original measure, used by Budge, Roberson and Hearl (1987), resulted from a 
two-stage factor analysis. In the first stage, the fifty-four coding categories were 
collapsed into seven issue areas. These seven issue areas were then factor analyzed 
and one or two factors were extracted for each area. The second stage involved factor 
analyzing the issue-area factors obtained in the first stage. The first factor from the 
second stage was interpreted as the left-right dimension.  
Laver and Budge (1992)employ a second technique for extracting a left-right 
dimension from these data. Through exploratory principal components analysis, they 
identify twenty policy dimensions composed of combinations of the fifty-four coding 
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categories. These twenty policy dimensions were then used in country-specific factor 
analyses from which three groups of coding categories were identified. The first two 
groups, each composed of thirteen categories, loaded on opposite ends of the scale 
and the third group, which was discarded, contained items which did not consistently 
load on either end. The resulting left-right placement was created by summing across 
the percentages of manifestos that fell into the two opposing groups and taking the 
diﬀerence of these two sums.  
A third approach was developed by Laver and Garry (2000) and Kim and Fording 
(1998).These authors felt the Laver/Budge method was flawed in that it did not take 
into account the percentage of a party’s manifesto that fell into left and right groups. 
That is, the Laver/Budge method is biased by a function of how much of a 
manifesto’s space was dedicated to the categories used to construct their scale. To 
correct for this, the new method used a diﬀerence of ratios rather than a diﬀerence of 
sums. The two sums from the Laver/Budge method were divided by the total number 
of left and right statements in a party’s manifesto and the resulting diﬀerence was the 
left-right placement.  
Klingemann (1995)developed a fourth method for extracting a left-right 
dimension from these data. As a point of departure from the previously described 
methods, Klingemann started with a deductively driven choice of categories to 
construct his scale. He then performed country-specific factor analyses and used the 
loadings from these analyses to develop a left-right placement score for each party.  
Gabel and Huber (2000)use yet another method to create a left-right measure 
from these data. Their ’vanilla method’ is designed to extract the ”underlying 
dimension that best accounts for the covariation among the fifty-four policy 
categories”. They argue that there is no a priori set of issues that defines left-right 
ideology over time and space. Rather, they seek to uncover the ’super issue’ that 
”most constrains parties’ positions across a broad range of policies” (Gabel and 
Huber 2000).Using regression scoring to develop a factor scale, the authors create an 
11 point scale on which parties are placed.  
These results of these five techniques all correlate quite highly (from 0.75 to 
0.88) demonstrating that there is some common structure to these data which is 
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argued to represent a left-right policy preference dimension. Strikingly, however, 
none of the measures address the issue of uncertainty involved with estimating a 
latent dimension. Rather, the resulting scales are treated as observed data. There are 
additional issues regarding the estimation techniques discussed above. The 
following section will discuss some of the data-driven problems before moving on to 
a formal treatment of the uncertainty issue and the presentation of our model for 
dealing with this.  
 
3. Problems with the MRG Data  
The manner in which the MRG data were collected and analyzed poses several 
problems which are not addressed by any of the techniques described above. Much of 
the research in the measurement-oriented literature on the MRG data has focused on 
cross-validating the diﬀerent measures developed from manifesto data and comparing 
these results to placements derived from expert surveys. Little attention, however, has 
been paid to the statistical reliability of these scales and the assumptions underlying 
the diﬀerent models used to extract substantive dimensions from these data. In this 
way, a majority of the work in this area has been dedicated to ’rearranging the deck 
chairs’ rather than improving the quality of measurement.  
Perhaps the most diﬃcult problem to overcome with the MRG data is the 
prevalence of zeros in the data. If a party makes no mentions of one of the fifty-four 
coding categories in its manifesto, the resulting cell entry in the data set is zero. These 
zeros are the result of at least three diﬀerent data generating processes, but have only 
one substantive interpretation: the party is neutral on that issue. First is the mutually 
exclusive nature of the content analysis coding procedures. That is, a statement from a 
party’s manifesto can only be coded into one category, forcing the coders to make 
subjective decisions when faced with statements that crosscut coding categories Laver 
and Garry (2000).Second is that a party may be truly be neutral or have no position on 
an issue or set of issues and therefore makes no references to it (them) in their 
manifesto. If this is the case, then the zero poses no substantive problem in the 
estimation of the latent dimension.  
Finally, zeros may be the result of a missing data problem. That is, a party may 
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have a position on an issue, but may choose not to reference it in its manifesto for 
several reasons. It may be that the party is split over an issue and therefore cannot 
present a coherent view. It is also likely the case that some parties do not feel the need 
to publish their position on some issues in that their stance is obvious (i.e. communist 
parties and favoring a controlled economy). Related to this explanation is the fact that 
space is limited in manifestos and parties must make strategic decisions as to which 
issues to address. Therefore the saliency of certain issues during certain elections 
could lead parties to omit references to issues on which they have a position in favor 
of issues that carry more weight given the electoral context at the time.  
Regardless of the data generating process, the zeros are problematic in the 
estimation of a latent dimension, since all of the strategies used to extract a left-right 
measure from the data are based on correlational structures. Treating the zeros as 
missing data rather than as neutral policy stances has the advantage of improving both 
the quality of the estimation and the substantive interpretation of the resulting 
scale(s).  
Another problematic issue with the treatment of the MRG data thus far involves 
the correlation of a party’s left-right placements across time. That is, the best guess 
for a party’s placement at time t is that party’s placement at time t-
 
1. The placements 
derived from the techniques described above, however, make no use of this 
information. The manner in which each party’s placements are estimated assumes that 
a party’s current left-right placement is independent of its previous placement, when 
this is clearly not the case. The result of this assumption is that parties ’leapfrog’ each 
others positions on the left-right dimension. Given our understanding of political 
parties, this is unlikely to accurately reflect reality; it is diﬃcult to imagine the British 
Conservatives as being ’left’ of Labour in any context.  
Finally, without a measure of uncertainty, we cannot know if movements within a 
party’s placement across time or diﬀerent placements between parties in the same 
time period are statistically significant. This seriously detracts from the expressed 
purpose of the MRG project, that is, tracking changes in policy preference over time 
and space. The techniques described above simply assume that diﬀerences in 
placements are meaningful while providing no evidence that this is the case (more on 
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this below).  
4. A Better Model?  
A more appropriate model for these data would address these issues directly. That 
is, a better measure of manifesto-based left-right scores would treat zeros as missing 
data rather than neutral stances, incorporate previous information in the estimation of 
current positions, and estimate the variance of these placements. Given these desired 
characteristics, conventional data reduction techniques are inappropriate for these 
data.  
A Bayesian approach to estimating this latent dimension oﬀers solutions to the 
above mentioned problems.
  
In the following section, we present a model that 
possesses the desired properties and results in a substantively intuitive measure of 
left-right placements. We also give a detailed description of our choice of items that 
represent diﬀerences in the policy preferences of political parties. For comparability 
with previous results, including expert surveys, we apply our model to the EU-15 
countries for the time period 1945-1998.  
5. Data  
The data provided by the Comparative Manifestos Project are an attempt to 
measure the important characteristics of party manifestos with the idea that given 
these data, parties will be able to be placed on comparable dimensions. At base, each 
manifesto variable is a count of sentences in the party manifesto that corresponds to a 
particular characteristic. Of these items, a number of them are “balanced” items or 
those that comprise two variables -one coding the number of positive statements about 
the characteristic and another coding the number of negative statements. Often, these 
positive and negative statements correspond clearly to left or right positions. We use 
these and a set of economic items that are not necessarily balanced, but are still 
identifiable as either left or right in orientation. Table 3.1 shows the set of variables 
used in this study.  
In previous studies, these variables have been used in their percentage form -that 
is each variable corresponds to the percentage of manifesto quasi-sentences that 
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correspond to that characteristic. However, we found that using either these variables 
or the logit of these variables (to put them on the entire real number line) produce 
suboptimal results. Instead, we choose to use these a bit diﬀerently. We use the total 
number of quasi-sentences to obtain the total number of conservative statements 
according to each of the above-mentioned variables. We then estimate this as a 
binomial with n equal to the total number of left plus right statements corresponding 
to the specific characteristic.  
Here, we treat zeroes diﬀerently as well. When a party makes absolutely no 
statements about a specific subject, for example centralization, we code the number of 
conservative sentences about that subject as missing and the number of total sentences 
about that subject as 25. Thus, we actually will get a sense of how many statements 
out of 25 would a party most likely have made had they chosen to talk about this 
issue. So, rather than treating no statement as completely neutral, we are treating it as 
missing and filling it in with “reasonable values” from the posterior distribution of the 
observed variable given the latent variable and coeﬃcient.  
For each country, we do not use all of these variables. Realizing that we wish to 
distinguish between the diﬀerent parties, we use the 5 variables (in percentage form) 
from the above list that have the most variance.
  
This selection mechanism implies yet 
another major diﬀerence between this study and several of the previous studies, 
namely that it is not appropriate here to compare parties across countries, though 
within-country comparisons are permitted and even encouraged. The original 
Manifesto work suggested, at least implicitly, that the parties would be comparable 
across countries.  
6.1 The Usual Suspects  
All of the Manifesto dimension reduction has been in the form of a summated 
rating scale. The theoretical model suggests that every observed variable is an 
imperfect manifestation of some underlying variable, in this case the left-right 
placement. In the limit, the idiosyncratic errors in these observed variables cancel out 
when they are summed or averaged. The underlying model is a linear one:  
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Xi,j = Ti + εi,j 
where i indexes observation and j indexes observed variable. Notice two things -
first, there is no coeﬃcient on T and second, there is no j subscript on T , the true 
underlying dimension is the same across all observed variables for the same 
observation. The model does make a few assumptions:  
1. ε ~ 
 
iid. 
2. cov(Ti, εl) = 0 
 
3.  E(εi) = 0. 
 
4.  Monotone Homogeneity: This simply states that each observed variable is 
monotonically related to the underlying true dimension. 
 
The first three are diﬀerent aspects of conditional independence. The fourth is self-
explanatory.  
The manifesto data (and all TSCS data) present a problem for this theoretical 
model. It is exceedingly unlikely that parties start from the ground up every election 
to remake their manifestoes. In fact, the most likely situation is one where parties start 
with largely the same document and tweak as necessary. This suggests that if the left-
right score is oﬀ at time t, it will probably be oﬀ in the same direction at time t + 1. 
Thus, the second assumption is almost certainly violated.  
The so-called “structural zeros problem” remains problematic here. When zeroes 
exist, the errors cannot be iid as predictions below zero are nonsensical. This is 
problematic not only for the original manifesto data, but also for the measures that use 
ratios and diﬀerences of ratios. Variables that have deterministic bounds cannot be 
iid. 
 
In sum, the assumptions underlying the summated rating model are not likely to 
hold given the unique characteristics of the MRG data.  
Another problem with the summated rating model is that there is no method 
inherent to the model for generating uncertainty estimates. The outcome of the 
modeling process is an estimate of the latent dimension (not the latent dimension 
itself). As with any estimate, we would like to know how precise it is -we would 
rather not treat our estimates as fixed-known parameters. Without any knowledge of 
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precision, there is no other option than to assume observed diﬀerences are statistically 
significant (or on the other hand to assume that no diﬀerences are statistically 
significant).  
We propose a model that does not make these restrictive assumptions. Further, our 
model does produce estimates of uncertainty for each latent variable point and the 
Bayesian framework allows these to be easily incorporated into predictive statistical 
models. It is this model we investigate below.  
6.2 The New Model  
Political Science has recently begun to move to the next level of latent variable 
modeling by using Bayesian models to estimate latent dimensions.
 
These models have 
two basic advantages over their frequentist counterparts:  
1. Observations can be modeled directly rather than relying on unreasonable 
assumptions such as multivariate normality.  
2. The model provides a straightforward method for obtaining standard error 
estimates for the latent variable and incorporating those into a predictive 
statistical model.  
Beyond these advantages, Bayesian models allow the user to estimate latent variable 
models that have no clear frequentist analog. Given the lack of fit (both empirical and 
theoretical) between the manifesto data and the set of “usual suspect” dimension-
reducing models (Summated Rating and Factor models), we chose to specify a 
Bayesian model that would take account of the unique nature of the Manifesto data 
and generate latent variable estimates that include standard errors. Specifically, we are 
estimating the following model (explanation to follow):  
Y ~ Binomial (ppie, npie) 
 
log (ppie /1- ppie ) = βiXpe   
where p indexes party, i indexes manifesto issue, e indexes election and:  
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βi ~ N(0,1) 
 
            Xp1 ~ N(µp,1) 
     Xpt ~  (Xpt-1,1) t = 2 : T 
              µp =ξηp 
           ξ ~ N(0,τξ )  
 
 
This model simply estimates the observed manifesto counts as arising from a 
binomial distribution with a party-issue-election specific probability that is a function 
of a party-election specific latent variable (Xpe) and an issue specific coeﬃcient (β). 
Since the variables are all right-wing issues, the coeﬃcients are truncated to be 
positive. As right-wing statements increase so should “rightness” (not to be confused 
with “correctness”). It is also often necessary to set at least the sign of one coeﬃcient 
to prevent label switching. The variance of the latent variable scores is 1 for 
identifiability. 
 
 
This model has several interesting features. First, it incorporates a random eﬀect in 
the prior for each party’s first election latent variable score. Given that Gelman (2005) 
suggests priors on the variances of such random eﬀects are often more informative 
than we are led to believe, especially IG(x, x), we take his suggestion and the model 
above uses a half-cauchy with a scale parameter of 10 for the variance of the random 
eﬀect. The model also uses a random-walk prior for each party’s latent variable scores 
for elections 2:T, where the prior distribution is normal with a variance of 1 and is 
centered at the party’s latent variable score for the previous election. This directly 
operationalizes the idea that our best guess of a party’s position (before looking at its 
manifesto) is its position in the previous period. If the manifesto suggests something 
diﬀerent, we want it to be able to speak loudly enough to override this prior belief. 
The best way to include this, then, is in the prior rather than the likelihood function.  
7. Results  
The result of this model is a latent dimension and a coeﬃcient relating that 
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dimension to the observed variable. The higher this coeﬃcient, the more closely the 
observed number of manifesto sentences follow a function of the latent left-right 
dimension. As was stated above, the latent variable model in general suggests that one 
underlying dimension (in this case, the general left-right dimension) is a good 
predictor of some observed characteristics (that are imperfect manifestations of this 
underlying dimension). However, very rarely do we actually look at the nature of 
these predictions.
 
Table 3.2 shows the coeﬃcients for the models for the UK, France 
and Germany. 
 
 
The result in which we are most interested is the latent variable estimate. Not only 
do we get an estimate of the underlying dimension, but we also get an estimate of the 
variance of each point estimate. From this, we can make statements about the 
probability that any two point estimates are statistically diﬀerent from each other. 
This is a particularly useful innovation. In previous studies, diﬀerences between 
parties were taken to be deterministic. That is to say party diﬀerences were taken to 
be fixed at the diﬀerence between their latent variable scores. However, given that our 
estimates of latent variable positions are just that, estimates, we should take this 
uncertainty into account. For any two parties, if the t-statistic of the difference is 
greater than the chosen critical value, we are suﬃciently certain that the two 
estimated party placements are diﬀerent for some reason other than chance, 
presumably because their true, but unknown party positions are distinct.  
All of this is pretty straightforward, but it doesn’t mean anything to practical 
researchers unless the resulting party placements make sense from a substantive point 
of view. This is not a statistical criterion, so there is no t-test for practicality, but we 
are confident that practical researchers will know it when they see it. We feel that our 
results make substantive sense. They capture the more prominent trends shown in the 
original manifesto data while smoothing out many of the places where parties cross 
over each other (which is largely a function of noise).  
It is diﬃcult to present visually all of the results from these models. Figure 3.1 
attempts to do this for the UK. This is a dotplot which is increasing from bottom to 
top in “rightness” (i.e, the rightmost party is at the top-right corner and the left-most 
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party is at the bottom right corner. The light gray lines represent +/-2 standard 
deviations. From this, it is easy to see a general pattern -Labour on the left and 
Conservative on the right with SDP and LDP in the middle. Furthermore, the error 
bars show us which party-elections are significantly diﬀerent from which others. For 
instance, we can see that the Thatcher conservatives are significantly more 
conservative than most other party-elections.  
In essence, any hypothesis about party diﬀerences could be tested with these 
graphs and a straight-edge. If two party-election confidence bounds are overlapping, 
there is no significant diﬀerence. If they do not overlap, there is a statistically 
significant diﬀerence between the party-elections. It would be even easier with a table 
of numeric placements and their confidence intervals or standard errors. These are 
available from the authors upon request.  
It is also instructive to look at our placements versus those of the MRG. While we 
wouldn’t expect them to be identical, we would expect them to be similar at least in 
broad trends. If our model is picking up something drastically diﬀerent from that of 
the MRG, it would be cause to revisit our results, but certainly not to throw them out. 
Figure 3.2 presents the MRG results along side our placements. In the interest of 
clarity, we do not present standard error bars here, but they do exist and could be 
plotted if desired.  
It is clear that the general trends are about the same for each country. The series 
are considerably smoother, though the correlations are relatively high between the 
Manifesto points and our points.
 
 Probably the biggest diﬀerence is that for France 
where the early Communists are right-wing. In our placements, the early French 
Communists start out on the far-left and generally stay there.  
8. Conclusion  
Few topics in Western-European Politics have been more contentious than the left-
right placement of political parties. Form surveys of experts and voters to the 
numerous analyses of party manifestoes -scholars have tried to “nail down” as 
precisely as possible the placement of parties on a left-right dimension. We 
specifically engage manifesto based research and attempt to move it in a new 
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direction. We argue that previous studies, while varied in their use of particular 
variables, have all employed a theoretical model that is inappropriate for the reduction 
of manifesto dimensionality. Although the summated rating model has been a 
workhorse in Political Science (and rightly so), it is inappropriate for these data (and 
TSCS data in general) because of its underlying assumptions.  
At least as problematic on practical grounds is the lack of a measure for 
uncertainty for the manifesto-based measure. If diﬀerences in party placements are 
observed, one is left with only two reasonable options: 1) assume all observed 
diﬀerences are meaningful or 2) assume no observed diﬀerences are meaningful, 
neither of which is particularly appealing. We feel that due to this lack of uncertainty, 
researchers have been prompted to look at the wrong things. Are the early French 
Communists right-wing? We don’t think so, but most researchers have chosen to look 
at all observed diﬀerences as meaningful, so the fact that the French Communists are 
toward the right-wing side, this is a major finding. We feel that many of these 
anomalous findings are a function of noise in the data and ought not be looked at as 
meaningful.  
We introduce a Bayesian factor model that has a few interesting characteristics:  
1.  It models observed counts of conservative statements about specific subjects as 
binomial using the total number of statements about that subject as n. In the case of 
zero, the count is coded as missing and is imputed by the model.  
 
2. We use a party-specific random-eﬀect prior for each party’s first election and a 
random walk prior for elections 2:T to operationalize our thoughts about party 
diﬀerences and the carryover of party manifestoes from election to election.  
 
3.  From this model, we can easily obtain standard errors for each point estimate.  
 
These can then either be used to see whether observed diﬀerences are significant or 
they can be incorporated into predictive statistical models.  
On substantive grounds, we are proposing a new measure of left-right party 
placements using manifesto data. This new measure is considerably smoother than 
previous measures and comes complete with standard error estimates for each point. 
On methodological grounds, rather than really proposing an innovation, we are 
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echoing the suggestions of Treier and Jackman (2005); Martin and Quinn (2002) and 
others proposing Bayesian latent variable models. These allow the user to estimate the 
correct model for the observed variables rather than assuming iid errors or 
multivariate normality. While this article may be a debut for this particular model, its 
sentiment can be found in numerous preceding works.  
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4.  Combining Data through SEM and Bayesian Approaches 
1.Introduction 
When dealing with probabilistic events, people seek information.  Not fully 
trusting a single source, we often turn to others in order to get as much information as 
possible before making a decision.  We do this when we do something as trivial as 
deciding where to go for dinner or as serious as questioning the diagnosis of a highly 
skilled physician. Of course we have our impulsive moments, but generally we know that 
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th opinions will help us make the ‘right’ choice. 
 Unfortunately, this standard operating procedure is not the standard in much 
social science research.  That is, when dealing with probabilistic events many researchers 
base their conclusions on models that include estimates of concepts they wish to measure.  
This is because many of the concepts we wish to include in our models are not directly 
measurable (i.e . democracy), but must instead be estimated using observable traits (ie 
free press, open elections) of the concept.  In our efforts to locate ‘good’ indicators of our 
concept or latent variable, we often find that we our choices are limited at best.  In these 
situations, we must sometimes rely on a single source of information with no option for a 
second opinion. 
  As technology and time progress, however, the body of empirical evidence and 
quantified data continues to grow.  This means that we are more likely to have more 
choices of observable traits of our latent variables.  Even in light of this development, 
vast amounts of research across the sub-fields of political science continue to base 
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estimates of latent variables on single sources of data.  We often form attachments to 
individual sources for a variety of reasons ranging from their performance in our models 
to the politics of academia, but it is also the case that properly combining sources of data 
requires a level of statistical sophistication that make some feel uncomfortable.  With 
nicely behaved data this is not usually the case, but more complicated data generating 
processes often require more complicated estimation procedures. 
Regardless of the cost, it is always better to have more data.  More sources of 
information allow us to triangulate our estimates and increase their reliability and 
validity.  “…But more data are better.  Triangulation then, is another word for referring to 
the practice of increasing the amount of information to bear on a theory or hypothesis” 
(King et al 1995).    
In this article, I will compare the results of different techniques for combining 
sources of data to estimate a latent dimension.  Specifically, I will combine data from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and surveys of party experts, MPs and MEPs, and 
voters in order to estimate a left-right dimension of political parties in Western Europe.  
The article will proceed by first introducing the sources of data and briefly discussing 
their strengths and weaknesses.  Next, I estimate a structural equation model (SEM) with 
two latent variables, economic left-right and GAL/TAN or new politics.   I then present a 
second SEM, this time including a latent variable to control for potential bias in the CMP 
data.  Next, I estimate a Bayesian model using expert survey data as the prior information 
and combining this with the CMP data to extract a single left-right dimension.   The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
modeling strategies. 
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2. Sources of  Data  
 There are several sources of political parties’ left-right positions that fit into two 
broadly-defined categories.  These are survey-based and content analysis-based.  
Surveys-based measures elicit opinions from party experts, political elites and voters as 
to the positions of parties on a variety of different issue areas.  These individual 
placements are then combined to construct left-right scores or placements through a 
variety of methods ranging from simple additive scales to more advanced factor analytic 
techniqes (Castles and Mair 1985, Laver and Hunt 1992, Ray 1999, Marks et al 2001, 
Benoit and Laver 2004—just to name a few).  
 The content analysis-based measures use data collected by quantifying the content 
of parties’ electoral manifestos.  The Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al) has 
developed the most widely used measure of left-right party placements using this 
technique.  The CMP data covers the entire post-War era and includes the OECD 
countries plus Israel.  Recently, the CMP data have expanded to include the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  The relatively large sample size and long time period make 
the CMP data highly desirable to those interested in tracking parties’ movements across 
time.   Because of these features, the CMP data are arguably the most important source of 
data on left-right party positions and have been used in over 100 published books and 
articles (see Schofield 1985, Budge et al 1987, Baron 1991, Laver and Budge 1992, 
Budge 1994, Adams 1998 and 2007, Warwick 1994 and 2000, MacDonald et al 2005 and 
2007—for just a few examples).   
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 Even though these data have been so widely used for over 20 years, only recently 
have scholars begun to scrutinize their reliability and validity  (Laver and Garry 1999, 
Harmel et al 1995, Gabel and Huber 2000, Bakker, Edwards and De Vries 2007, Benoit, 
Laver and Mikhaylov 2007).  My own previous research details the results of this 
scrutiny.  Perhaps the most important finding thus far is that the data generating process 
behind the CMP data is not appropriately modeled using standard data reduction 
techniques (Armstrong and Bakker 2006).  The effects of this inappropriate modeling are 
difficult to predict and can range from over-confidence in one’s results to nonsensical 
substantive interpretations.   
 As previous research has demonstrated, the CMP data are quite volatile and 
parties seem to move all over the political spectrum from election to election.  Experts, 
on the other hand, tend to provide much more stable, flat estimates over time with parties 
moving much less obviously.  Believers in the CMP data argue that this difference in 
predicting change in the strength of their data and the weakness of the expert surveys 
(Budge and MacDonald 2006) while defenders of expert surveys say the opposite (Marks 
et al 2007).  By combining these sources, we should be able to borrow from the relative 
strengths while limiting the effects of the weaknesses in order to triangulate on a more 
valid measure of left-right.  Given some data-based restraints (short time series vs. long 
time series) and some difficulties in estimation, I will present cross-sectional results of 
different techniques for combining these sources below.  Having said that, work is 
presently underway on developing models that take account of the temporal nature of 
these data and allow us to combine sources that are available at irregular intervals or 
missing for certain time points.   
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3. The Structural Equation Modeling Approach 
 “Structural equation modeling can perhaps best be defined as a class of 
methodologies that seeks to represent hypotheses about the means, variances, and 
covariances of observed data in terms of a smaller number of “structural” parameters 
defined by an underlying model” (Kaplan 1955).  Factor analysis and other similar latent 
variable and data reduction models are widely used in the social sciences (see Jacoby 
1991 and Bollen 1989).   These techniques are very useful for discovering underlying 
structure to data and for confirming hypotheses about relationships between latent 
concepts and observable indicators.  Given these characteristics, this seems an 
appropriate technique for combining different sources of left-right placements in order to 
recover a more valid measure. 
 The first model below is a confirmatory factor analysis that estimates a two-latent 
variable solution.  The latent concepts in this model are economic left-right, representing 
the classic left-right continuum of European party politics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and 
GAL/TAN (Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalistic) or 
new politics (Marks, Hooghe, and Wilson 2003).   I use three sources of data in order to 
estimate this model:  the CMP data, surveys of party experts (Marks and Steenbergen 
1999) and surveys of MP/MEPs (Katz et al 1999).  Do to the timing of the surveys, this 
analysis is restricted to a cross-section of 85 parties using data for 1999. 
For indicators of the economic left-right latent variable I used the general left-right 
measure from the experts, scaled from 0 to 10 with low numbers representing left-wing 
positions.  I additively combined three variables from the MP survey (all Likert scales) to 
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construct an economic left-right variable and I selected issues from the CMP data that 
clearly aligned with left and right-wing policy preferences to construct the manifesto 
economic indicator.  Figure 4.1 presents the path diagram and Table 4.1 presents the 
results of this model. 
The results of this model show that this model fits the data very well.  The non-
significant Χ2 tells us that the difference between the implied and the empirical 
covariance matrices is not statistically significant.  This somewhat rare result may be due 
to a relatively small sample size (Bollen 1989), but is most likely illustrative of a good-
fitting model.  These results tell us that the latent constructs of economic left-right and 
GAL/TAN account for over 70% of the variance in the observed indicators from the 
survey-based measures, but only 60% of the CMP economic variable and only 40% of 
the CMP GAL/TAN. 
The above model also allows the two latent variables to be correlated rather than 
imposing orthoganality.  This makes good substantive sense and yields a much better 
fitting model.  The estimated correlation between the two factors is 0.77, showing a 
strong relationship between general left-right and GAL/TAN in this sample. 
Although a very good fitting model, the CMP measures stand out as the least 
valid observable indicators of these two latent variables.  One possibility is that the CMP 
data suffer from some sort of systematic error or bias.  The multi-trait multi method 
model (MTMM) developed by Campell and Fiske (1959) was designed for exactly this 
purpose—to uncover systematic error.  More recently, Bollen and Paxton (1998) have 
shown that the MTMM model can be used to predict, thus control for, systematic error. 
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The MTMM model is quite simple, although some of the data requirements are 
somewhat demanding.  In order to run the MTMM model, you must have at least two 
latent concepts and three indicators of each concept (as in model 1).  This model adds an 
additional latent variable, called a method factor, which is used to explain the residual 
variance for a particular set of indicators.  That is, this factor is meant to uncover the 
instrument specific shared bias not the substantively shared variance.   You can estimate 
as many method factors as there are sources of data in the model in theory, however 
identification issues do come into play.   
In order to test whether or not there is systematic error in the CMP indicators, I 
specified exactly the same model as above but added an additional latent variable—
Manifesto Method Factor.  If the factor loadings and the variance of the latent variable 
are significant, then there is evidence of bias in the CMP indicators.  Also, we would 
expect to see an overall improved model fit if this were the case.  The results of this 
model are presented in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 shows the path diagram. 
Two things stand out when looking at these results.  First the factor loadings from 
the method factor are non-significant.  Also, the overall fit of the model actually gets 
marginally worse when including this method factor.  The explained variance of the 
manifesto-based indicators does increase, but this is not evidence to support a method 
factor.  Finally, the variance of the method factor is not significant leading me to reject 
the inclusion of this factor and to favor the first model based on parsimony and ease of 
interpretation.   
 There are several possible reasons why the MTMM model shows no evidence of 
systematic error in the CMP indicators.  The first is that there may be no systematic error 
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in the CMP indicators.  Although a nice, clean solution, it does not follow that there is 
bias in these indicators simply because they are the least valid indicators in the model.  A 
second possibility is that the common factor model with its assumptions of multivariate 
normality is not the appropriate model for CMP data.  As shown in my previous research, 
attempting to model these data as normal can be highly problematic.  The variables used 
in the CMP data are not iid, in fact values of all indicators are highly dependent on the 
values of the other indicators given the mutually exclusive coding categories in the 
original data collection procedures.  Also, the high prevalence of zeros in the data creates 
additional noise in these indicators that almost certainly looks random not systematic.   
 Regardless of the specific issues with the CMP data in this analysis, these types of 
factor models are often misused by researchers in the social sciences.  It is very common 
for researchers to run models similar to those above and then to extract factor scores, 
values of the latent variable for each case, and then to treat this estimate as an observed 
variable with no measure of uncertainty.  This technique obviously leads to over-
confident results as the uncertainty inherent in the estimated variable is ignored when 
using this latent variable in a predictive model.   
 SEMs, however, were designed to simultaneously estimate predictive and 
measurement models—seemingly overcoming the problem described above.  This is not 
exactly the case, though.  That is, when estimating full structural models, those with 
measurement and predictive components, the joint likelihood of both parts of the model is 
estimated at the same time.  In other words, the values of the latent variable are not first 
estimated allowing uncertainty to propagate through to the predictive part of the model.  
Rather, SEM attempts to fit the model that has been specified through a comparison of 
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means and covariances.  Presently, research is underway comparing the results of SEMs 
to other techniques (Armstrong, Dutch, Bakker 2007).  The initial results show that SEMs 
often lead to inflated coefficients with overconfident results compared to other 
techniques, such as Bayesian models, which first estimate values of the latent variable 
along with measures of uncertainty and then incorporate this uncertainty in the predictive 
model.   
 
4.  The Bayesian Approach 
 Although SEMs provide a user-friendly procedure for combining sources of data 
to estimate latent variables, problems still exist when using the estimates on either side of 
the equation in predictive models.  We must choose to either ignore the uncertainty and 
treat our latent variable as observed or model the measurement and predictive models 
simultaneously  without recovering estimates of our latent variable—which is often of 
substantive interest.   
 Bayesian models, on the other hand, allow the research considerably more 
flexibility than traditional SEMs and yield the quantities we are interested in while 
possessing desirable statistical properties.  For example, the Bayesian framework allows 
us to more directly and appropriately model the data generating process rather than 
relying on assumptions of normality.  We can also get estimates of our latent variables 
along with measures of uncertainty and directly model this uncertainty into predictive 
models.  Most importantly, Bayesian models allow researchers to incorporate prior 
subjective information into our models, which is particularly valuable when using social 
science data.  Rather than ignoring previous research, we can directly model our 
 44 
expectations based on this previous research (see Gill 2002 for a detailed discussion of 
these benefits).   
 As a means of combining sources of information, this modeling technique makes 
intuitive sense.  In terms of estimating left-right party placements, a Bayesian model 
gives the opportunity to specify priors as a sort of ‘best guess’ as to the parties left-right 
score while letting the data diverge from this prior when it speaks loudly enough.  The 
resulting posterior distribution is then a weighted compromise between prior information 
and the data used to predict party placements, with the data carrying more weight as 
sample size increases. 
 A recent development in Bayesian work is the use of elicited priors.  That is, 
priors that are elicited from subject-area specialists in such a way as to develop 
“probability structures that reflect their specific qualitative knowledge and perhaps 
experiential intuition about the studied effects” (Gill and Walker 2005).  An example of 
this is when researchers query doctors as to the probability of survival of patients with 
varying symptoms and characteristics.  After collecting or eliciting such information, the 
researcher can then specify a probability distribution for survival, in this example, given a 
set of covariates.   
 Following this logic, the combination of expert surveys and CMP data seems 
quite amenable to this modeling strategy.   The nature of the party expert survey, with 
parties being placed by several experts, allows us to develop probability structures around 
the parties’ placements.  That is, we can take a mean and standard deviation of placement 
scores for each party, based on n experts and specify a probability distribution for each 
party in the sample.  Assuming normality somewhat simplifies this process, but this is not 
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a difficult assumption to defend given the empirical distribution of the raw expert 
placements.   
 With this expert prior in hand, the rest of the model is rather straightforward to 
estimate.  Following the previous chapter’s advice, I specify a binomial distribution for 
the CMP data estimating the probability a party makes a right-wing statement given their 
value on the latent variable.  There are two major differences between this model and the 
Bayesian model from the previous chapter.  First, the present model is only a cross-
section rather than time series cross sectional data.  In this model, I use the 2002 Chapel 
Hill Party Expert Survey to form the prior distributions and the most recent version of the 
CMP data.  The resulting data set has 72 parties from Western Europe.   
 A more important difference, however, is the inclusion of a country- issue specific 
intercept in the model.  This allows different party systems to be more left or right than 
others and facilitates cross-national comparisons of party placements.  The only 
assumption this requires is that the effect of the latent variable on each of the observed 
variables is constant across countries.  The model is as follows: 
Yij ~ Binomial(pij, nij) 
Logit (pij) = aij + bj Xi 
 
Where Yij  is the number of statements party i makes about issue j, pij  is the probability 
that party i makes a right-wing statement about issue j, and nij is the total number of left 
and right-wing statements party i  makes about issue j.  The aij  term is the country-issue 
intercept, Xi  is the value of the latent variable for party i, and bj  is the effect of the latent 
variable on the probability that a party makes a right-wing statement about issue j.    
 The elicited prior specification described above is modeled in the following way: 
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Xi ~ Normal(µi, τi) 
 Where µi  is the mean of the expert placements for party i and τi is the precision (the 
inverse of the variance) of the expert placement for party i.   The priors for the bj  and aij 
parameters are all given diffuse normal priors.  The model was estimated using 
WinBUGS and showed strong evidence of convergence after 5000 iterations.  The first 
1000 iterations were discarded and the model results are based on the remaining 4000 
chain values.   
 There are two sets of quantities of interest from the model results.  First are the 
factor loadings (the bj estimates) and next are the Xi  values (the left-right placements). 
The model was also run using  so-called ‘non-informative’ or naïve priors to demonstrate 
that the expert prior is not driving the results that we see.  The factor loadings are 
presented in Table 4.3. These loadings are posterior means and standard deviations. 
With the exception of Internationalism, the latent variable has the expected effect 
on the observed indicators.  That is, the more right-wing a party is, the more likely they 
are to make right-wing statements about these issues.  Given that the model specified a 
logit link function; these parameters indicate the effect of the latent variable on the 
probability that a party will make right-wing statements about these issues, conditional on 
the number of sentences dedicated to both right and left-wing positions on that issue.  The 
coefficient for the effect of the latent variable on Internationalism is troubling at best.  
This result is interpreted as meaning the more right-wing a party is, the less likely it is to 
make right-wing statements about this issue.  
  These results can also be displayed graphically by plotting  pij  against the latent 
variable score.  Figure 4.3 shows this relationship for the CMP category Military. 
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Here we can see the value of the country-issue specific intercept in allowing cross-
national comparison as well as the validity of this indicator and its ability to discriminate 
between parties on the left-right dimension.   For this indicator Figure 3 shows that in 
France a party need only move a bit to the right to drastically increase the probability that 
it makes a pro-military statement in its manifesto whereas in Ireland a party must be very 
far to the right in order to do so.  Therefore we can assess the impact of the left-right 
score on the probability of making right-wing states both between and within countries.  
The steepness of the curve also tells us that this is an issue that discriminates between 
parties on the left-right dimension and corresponds to a relatively large factor loading.  
Flatter curves indicate issues on which the difference between left and right parties is less 
clear.  The graphs for the remaining nine items are included in the appendix to this paper. 
The similarity between the model results is striking given the very different nature 
of the priors used in the two models and the relatively small sample size.  This is a nice 
robustness test and demonstrates that the prior is not driving these results.   The expert 
prior model is slightly more efficient on average, but the substantive results of the two 
models are practically identical. 
The other main quantity of interest from this model is latent variable itself.  As 
mentioned earlier, the posterior distribution is a compromise between the expert 
judgments and the CMP data.  Comparing the ordering of the parties from left to right 
across the original CMP data, the original expert data and the posterior distribution of this 
model yields some very interesting results.  The best way to view this comparison is to 
look at the individual orderings together and to note the differences.  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 
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present this comparison.  For ease of viewing, I have split the data between the two 
tables. 
The middle column of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 is the ordering of the parties from left to 
right using the posterior distribution of the latent variable with expert priors.  What is 
most striking about this result is how different the posterior ordering is from the CMP 
ordering or the expert ordering.  Here you can see the Bayesian machine at work—that is, 
you can see the compromise between the two sources of data.   
 A final feature of this model is that it yields both estimates of the left-right 
placements and their standard deviations.  Given this information, we can test whether or 
not the difference between two parties is statistically significant.  With further advances 
to this model, time could also be included and we could then also test whether or not 
movements over time were significant or not. 
 
5. Discussion 
      This paper has attempted to address the question of how best to combine different 
sources of left-right party placements in order to develop a more reliable and valid 
measure of this concept.  The two main strategies are structural equation modeling and 
Bayesian modeling.  Adjudicating between these two choices is neither straightforward 
nor is it based solely on statistical criteria.  The SEM framework allows the researcher to 
estimate such dimensions with relative ease, but imposes some unrealistic assumptions.  
The Bayesian model is free from many of the assumptions necessary in the SEM world 
and provides a much more flexible tool for extracting latent dimensions, but comes at the 
cost of relatively high technological sophistication.  The answer to which is better 
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ultimately comes down to a question of philosophical belief.  I argue that the Bayesian 
model is superior in that it directly estimates the latent variable and incorporates the 
uncertainty present in these estimates into the predictive model.  The Bayesian 
framework also gives us the opportunity to utilize prior information when estimating or 
quantities of interest, rather than forcing us to pretend that we know nothing a priori 
about the world we are researching. 
      In terms of how each of the above modeling techniques perform in light of a 
predictive model, the results (not presented here) are somewhat mixed.  Presently, we are 
exploring the differences between modeling strategies in terms of their predictive ability.  
Initial results show that the traditional SEM models tend to over-inflate coefficients while 
under-estimating uncertainty (Armstrong, Dutch, Bakker 2007).  This result leads to the 
conclusion that the most efficient estimator is not necessarily the best estimator.  
Although somewhat counter-intuitive, this fact is widely recognized in the social sciences 
(robust standard errors for example).   
      Finally,  the Bayesian model allows us to use expert judgments in a creative, 
appealing fashion.  This paper demonstrates that even if priors were not explicitly elicited 
from experts, we can use these types of surveys to design intelligent and informative 
priors.  In the case of party experts and CMP data, we see that the experts provide a 
‘second opinion’ that is often quite different from the CMP placements.   The resulting 
scale incorporate features of both data sources, has desirable statistical properties and is 
easily amenable to predictive models. 
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Appendix A: 
Tables from Chapters 2-4. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Left/Right Items used in the MRG: 
Left Items Right Items 
Anti-Imperialism 
Military Negative 
Peace 
Internationalism Positive 
Democracy 
Market Regulation 
Economic Planning 
Protectionism Positive 
Controlled Economy 
Nationalization 
Welfare State Expansion 
Education Expansion 
Labour Groups Positive 
Military Positive 
Freedom-Human Rights 
Constitutionalism Positive 
Political Authority 
Free Enterprise 
Incentives 
Protectionism Negative 
Economic Orthodoxy 
Welfare State Limitation 
National Way of Life Positive 
Traditional Morality Positive 
Law and Order 
Social Harmony 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: MRG Left Scale Reliability Statistics: 
Country Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Sweden .305 13 
Denmark .539 13 
Finland -.207 13 
Belgium .367 13 
Netherlands .536 13 
Luxembourg -.547 13 
France .669 13 
Italy .349 13 
Spain -.107 13 
Greece .151 13 
Portugal .051 13 
Germany -.023 13 
Austria .308 13 
Great Britain .456 13 
Ireland .168 13 
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Table 2.3:MRG Right Scale Reliability Statistics: 
Country Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Sweden .594 13 
Denmark .424 13 
Finland -.303 13 
Belgium .353 13 
Netherlands .383 13 
Luxembourg .268 13 
France .367 13 
Italy .334 13 
Spain .590 13 
Greece .401 13 
Portugal -.435 13 
Germany .256 13 
Austria .376 13 
Great Britain .635 13 
Ireland .150 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Left and Right Items with Loadings above 0.3, by country 
Country Left Items  Right Items  
Sweden Nationalization, Controlled Economy, 
Market Regulation 
National Way Life Positive, Free 
Enterprise, Military Positive, 
Freedom-Hum Rights  
Denmark Labour Groups Positive, Education 
Expansion, Welfare State Expansion, 
Democracy 
Law and Order, Political 
Authority, Incentives 
Finland Military Negative, Peace, 
Nationalization 
Economic Orthodoxy, Welfare 
State Limitation, Free Enterprise 
 
Belgium Nationalization, Controlled Economy, 
Economic Planning, Military Negative 
 
Netherlands  Economic Planning, Controlled 
Economy, Democracy, Peace, 
Nationalization, 
Economic Orthodoxy, Military 
Positive, Incentives, Free 
Enterprise 
Luxembourg Military Negative, Market Regulation, 
Labour Groups Pos, Peace 
Protectionism Negative, Law and 
Order, Welfare Limitation, 
Incentives. 
France Labour Groups Poitive, 
Nationalization, Military Negative, 
Peace, Controlled Econ 
Traditional Morality, Law and 
Order, National Way Life, 
Military Positive 
Table 4 cont’d 
Italy  Military Negative, Peace, 
Protectionism, Labour Groups Positive  
Protectionism, Free Enterprise, 
Economic Orthodoxy. 
Spain Anti-Imperialism, Military Negative, 
Education Expansion 
Economic Orthodoxy, Traditional 
Morality, Law and Order, 
Incentives, Free Enterprise 
Greece Internationalism Positive, Welfare State 
Expansion, Education Expansion 
Military Positive, Traditional 
Morality, Law and Order 
Portugal Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, Labour 
Groups Positive, Internationalism 
Positive 
Law and Order, Incentives, 
Military Positive, Welfare 
Limitation. 
 
Germany Peace, Internationalism Positive, 
Military Negative 
Economic Orthodoxy, Military 
Positive, Social Harmony, Free 
Enterprise 
Austria Democracy, Internationalism Positive, 
Peace 
Incentives, Free Enterprise, 
Economic Orthodoxy, 
Constitutionalism Positive 
United Kingdom 
 
Labour Groups Positive, 
Nationalization, Market Regulation, 
Controlled Econ. 
Military Positive, Free 
Enterprise, Economic Orthodoxy, 
Constitutionalism Positive, 
National Way Life. 
Ireland 
 
Military Negative, Peace, 
Internationalism Positive, Economic 
Planning. 
Traditional Morality, National 
Way Life, Constitutionalism 
Positive 
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Table 2.5: Results of the Factor Analysis of the Left Items for  
United Kingdom, 1945-1970: 
Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Military: Negative .862 -.093 .004 -.145 .242 
Anti-Imperialism .860 .076 -.275 .036 -.257 
Peace .244 .756 -.003 -.039 .099 
Welfare State 
Expansion -.375 .734 -.011 .047 .007 
Market Regulation .050 .615 .531 -.099 .010 
Education 
Expansion -.504 .549 -.475 .272 .015 
Labour  Groups: 
Positive -.212 -.050 .861 .065 .029 
Controlled Economy -.039 .120 .778 .393 -.338 
Economic Planning -.094 .182 .077 .857 -.010 
Protectionism: 
Positive -.040 -.208 .100 .833 -.053 
Democracy -.104 -.234 .118 -.240 .816 
Internationalism: 
Positive -.057 .341 -.207 .239 .755 
Nationalization -.380 -.177 .156 .054 -.562 
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Table  2.6: Results of the Factor Analysis of the Left Items for  
United Kingdom,  1970-1998:  
Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Labour  Groups: 
Positive .909 -.021 -.058 .043 -.065 .001 
Nationalization .743 -.104 .062 .183 .094 .187 
Market Regulation .501 .351 .116 -.115 .195 -.235 
Education 
Expansion -.101 .851 .049 -.192 -.028 .201 
Welfare State 
Expansion .040 .811 .142 .289 -.005 -.223 
Internationalism: 
Positive .125 .118 .797 -.126 -.187 .020 
Peace -.090 .063 .785 .062 .212 -.113 
Controlled Economy .377 -.150 -.083 .753 .029 -.175 
Military: Negative .343 -.124 .166 -.630 .064 -.177 
Economic Planning .301 .097 .428 .591 -.003 .211 
Democracy -.142 -.148 .160 -.072 -.834 -.127 
Anti-Imperialism -.070 -.294 .386 -.158 .680 -.057 
Protectionism: 
Positive .062 -.007 -.051 .054 .081 .912 
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Table 2.7: New Left Reliability Statistics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8: New Right Reliability Statistics 
Country Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Sweden .540 5 
Denmark .544 4 
Finland .249 4 
Belgium .440 3 
Netherlands .590 5 
Luxembourg .638 5 
France .767 4 
Italy .516 3 
Spain .841 5 
Greece .441 4 
Portugal .523 4 
Germany .684 5 
Austria .643 4 
Great Britain .678 5 
Ireland .510 3 
Country Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Sweden .687 6 
Denmark .489 5 
Finland .642 3 
Belgium .548 5 
Netherlands .605 6 
Luxembourg .658 4 
France .826 6 
Italy .566 4 
Spain .547 4 
Greece .510 5 
Portugal .468 5 
Germany .566 3 
Austria .566 3 
Great Britain .630 6 
Ireland .723 4 
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Table 3.1.  Balanced Manifesto Items 
 
 
 Right-Wing Left-Wing 
Military + - 
Internationalism - + 
Constitutionalism + - 
Centralization - + 
Protectionism - + 
Welfare State - + 
Educational Expansion - + 
National Way of Life + - 
Multiculturalism - + 
Labour Groups - + 
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Table 4.1  Confirmatory Factor Anaysis of Economic Left-Right and GAL/TAN 
 Factor Loading Residual 
Variance 
R2 
Expert_Econ 0.91 0.17 0.83 
Man_Econ 0.77 0.40 0.60 
MP_Econ 0.85 0.27 0.73 
Expert_G/T 0.84 0.30 0.70 
Man_G/T -0.63 0.60 0.40 
MP_G/T 0.99 0.01 0.99 
    
           Χ
2
 = 6.88 df = 6.    CFI = 0.99.  90% CI RMSEA = [0.00 ,0.115] n = 85. 
                 Factor loadings are fully standardized.  All factor loadings are significant at the p<.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.  MTMM model of Economic Left-Right and GAL/TAN 
 Factor Loading Residual 
Variance 
R2 
Expert_Econ 0.91 0.17 0.83 
Man_Econ 0.77 0.38 0.62 
MP_Econ 0.86 0.27 0.73 
Expert_G/T 0.84 0.30 0.70 
Man_G/T 0.99 0.48 0.52 
MP_G/T 0.63 0.01 0.99 
Man_Econ 
Method Factor 
 
0.16*   
Man_G/T 
Method Factor 
 
0.34*   
Chi2 = 6.13 df = 6.    CFI = 0.98.  90% CI RMSEA = [0.00 ,0.14] n = 85. 
                   Factor loadings are fully standardized.  All loadings are significant at the p<.05 level except *. 
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Table 4.3.  Factor loadings from Bayesian measurement model with expert 
and naïve priors 
 Expert mean Expert SD Naïve mean Naïve SD 
Military 1.33 0.02 3.13 0.15 
Internationalism -0.41 0.01 -0.97 0.05 
Constitutionalism 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.02 
Protectionism 0.69 0.02 1.65 0.09 
Welfare State 0.77 0.01 1.82 0.09 
Education 0.61 0.03 1.61 0.10 
Natl Way of Life 1.68 0.05 4.01 0.22 
Multinationalism 1.98 0.04 5.01 0.26 
Labour Groups 1.28 0.03 3.17 0.17 
Economic Policy 0.63 0.01 1.48 0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 4.4.  Order of parties’ left-right placements for the left half of the data 
man.order man.expert.order expert.order 
AUT: GA Gr SWE: Vp Co GRE: KKE C 
SPA: PCE-I SPA: PCE-I POR: CDU D 
SWE: Vp Co AUT: GA Gr FRA: PCF C 
IRE: Green GRE: KKE C GER: PDS P 
ITA: RC Ne SPA: PSOE SWE: Vp Co 
GER: PDS P FIN: VL Le ITA: RC Ne 
IRE: LP La SWE: Green IRE: Green 
DEN: SF So GRE: SAP C DEN: SF So 
POR: CDU D AUT: SPO S FIN: VL Le 
BEL: Agale FIN: VL Gr SPA: PCE-I 
GER: Allia UK: LDP Li NET: GL Gr 
GRE: SAP C SPA: CiU C BEL: Ecolo 
SPA: PSOE SWE: KdS C BEL: Agale 
BEL: Ecolo SPA: PNV E FRA: Green 
SWE: Green BEL: Agale AUT: GA Gr 
BEL: PS Fr IRE: Green GRE: SAP C 
BEL: CVP F FRA: PS So ITA: PCI-P 
POR: PSP S BEL: Ecolo IRE: LP La 
FRA: Green SWE: FP Li SWE: Green 
FIN: VL Le AUT: FPO F BEL: PS Fr 
NET: GL Gr FRA: Green GER: Allia 
FRA: PS So FIN: SKL C BEL: SP Fl 
SPA: PNV E ITA: RC Ne SWE: SdaP 
AUT: SPO S DEN: SF So FIN: SSDP 
UK: LDP Li BEL: CVP F FIN: VL Gr 
FIN: VL Gr SWE: SdaP AUT: SPO S 
NET: D 66 FIN: SK Fi UK: LDP Li 
BEL: PSC F BEL: PS Fr FRA: PS So 
BEL: VB Fl POR: CDU D GRE: PASOK 
IRE: PD Pr BEL: VB Fl DEN: SD So 
BEL: SP Fl GER: PDS P GER: SPD S 
IRE: Fiann IRE: LP La SPA: PSOE 
ITA: PCI-P DEN: RV Ra NET: PvdA 
GRE: PASOK UK: Labour POR: PSP S 
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Table 4.5.  Order of parties’ left-right placements for the right half of the data 
 
 
 
 
 
     
man.order man.expert.order expert.order 
DEN: RV Ra UK: Conser NET: D 66 
IRE: Fine FIN: SSDP DEN: RV Ra 
SPA: CiU C FRA: PCF C UK: Labour 
FIN: RKP S SPA: AP,PP SWE: CP Ce 
NET: PvdA NET: GL Gr IRE: Fiann 
GRE: ND Ne GER: Allia BEL: PSC F 
FIN: SSDP BEL: PSC F SPA: PNV E 
GER: SPD S AUT: OVP C FRA: UDF 
SWE: SdaP SWE: CP Ce IRE: Fine 
SWE: KdS C NET: D 66 GER: CDU-C 
FIN: SK Fi BEL: PVV F BEL: CVP F 
UK: Labour GRE: ND Ne GER: FDP F 
AUT: FPO F GRE: PASOK FIN: SK Fi 
POR: PP Po NET: PvdA NET: CDA C 
NET: CDA C BEL: SP Fl SPA: CiU C 
FIN: SKL C POR: PSP S SWE: FP Li 
SWE: FP Li DEN: SD So GRE: ND Ne 
POR: PSD S FRA: UDF BEL: PVV F 
DEN: SD So FRA: FN Na POR: PSD S 
FRA: UDF NET: CDA C FIN: RKP S 
SPA: AP,PP DEN: V Lib FIN: SKL C 
BEL: PVV F FIN: KK Na SPA: AP,PP 
GER: FDP F GER: SPD S ITA: FI Fo 
NET: VVD L ITA: PCI-P DEN: KF Co 
UK: Conser NET: VVD L AUT: OVP C 
DEN: V Lib IRE: Fiann FIN: KK Na 
SWE: CP Ce FIN: RKP S SWE: KdS C 
FRA: PCF C IRE: PD Pr DEN: V Lib 
DEN: KF Co SWE: MSP C NET: VVD L 
AUT: OVP C GER: FDP F ITA: LN No 
GER: CDU-C IRE: Fine UK: Conser 
FIN: KK Na GER: CDU-C IRE: PD Pr 
GRE: KKE C DEN: KF Co SWE: MSP C 
ITA: LN No POR: PSD S ITA: AN Na 
ITA: FI Fo POR: PP Po POR: PP Po 
ITA: AN Na ITA: FI Fo AUT: FPO F 
SWE: MSP C ITA: AN Na BEL: VB Fl 
          FRA: FN Na ITA: LN No FRA: FN Na 
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Figure  2.1: Tracking Party Positions across Time on MRG Left/Right 
Dimension, United Kingdom 
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Figure 2.2: Tracking Party Positions across Time on MRG Left/Right 
Dimension, France 
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Figure 2.3: Frequency of Zeros: Ant-Imperialism  
 
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00
Anti-Imperialism
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Mean = 0.4231
Std. Dev. = 1.28835
N = 1,261
Anti-Imperialism
 
 
Figure 2.4: Frequency of Zeros:  Nationalization  
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Figure 2.5: Tracking Party Positions across Time on New Left/Right 
Dimension, United Kingdom:  
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Figure 2.6: Tracking Party Positions across Time on New Left/Right Dimension, 
France 
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Figure 3.1.  UK Party Placements from Bayesian Factor Model 
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Figure 3.2  Comparison of CMP and Armstrong-Bakker Left-Right Placements 
for  UK 
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Figure 4.1.  Two-latent variable measurement model. 
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Figure 4.2.  Two-latent variable model with method factor. 
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Figure 4.3.  Probability of making pro-Military statements given left-right score. 
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